mon law as supra-personal and beyond improvement, Tucker delighted in documenting how Americans of his time had improved upon it and eliminated its shortcomings. 7 Largely forgotten today, Tucker returned to some legal prominence last Term, when the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller 8 cited his annotated Blackstone's Commentaries as proof that the Second Amendment had originally been understood as an individual right to arms. 9 The dissent also invoked Tucker's lecture notes to argue that, during the Framing period, he had seen it as a militia-related right of States. 10 Tucker taught his law students from extensive handwritten lecture notes, compiled in bound volumes. His notes were preserved, and today are archived in the Tucker-Coleman Collection of the Earl Gregg Swem Library at the College of William and Mary. 11 The following is a transcription of the portion dealing with the Bill of Rights, which follows Tucker's discussion of the limits placed upon Congress by Article I, Section 10. The main text appears to date from 1791-92, with some marginal notes added later. 12 Given his position and their dating, Tucker's notes are exceptional evidence of original public understanding and indispensible tools for originalist interpretation.
Given contemporary adherence to originalist interpretation, and the likelihood of future conflict-as demonstrated in Heller-between varieties of originalist analysis, dissemination of Tucker's hitherto unpublished lecture notes 13 may offer an important contextualization of the Bill of Rights during the Founding period. It is my hope that working to democratize, as it were, the availability of these documents will assist future historical and 7 See id. at 140-43. 8 128 S. Ct. 2783 Ct. (2008 . 9 Id. at 2805. 10 Id. at 2839 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's response, id. at 2805 n.19, assumes that the passage quoted by the dissent is in fact Tucker's discussion of the Second Amendment. In this both majority and dissent were misled. See infra Part II. 11 Tucker's legal papers are presently being edited into a two-volume edition, due for publication in 
B. Speech and Press
The American concept of freedom of expression was, in Tucker's time, undergoing a transition. Some held to the view that it went no further than prior restraint: writers took the risk of seditious libel prosecutions, or civil actions, once they were in print. Others were beginning to see freedom of expression in a broader light, a view that did not really take hold until the Sedition Act of 1798. 20 Tucker is ahead of his time, taking a robust view of Americans' rights. Even in time of -national struggles‖ limitations on freedom of expression are traps rather than benefits and marks of tyrannical tendencies; Tucker cites as illustrative Virginia's wartime limit on pro-British expression. Tucker's reference to freedom from exemption from -coercion‖ brings to mind the modern concept of -chilling effects.‖ In all these things, the eigh- Tucker's lecture notes provide strong evidence for the Heller majority. He considers the right to arms the palladium (in eighteenth-century terms, the ultimate protection) of liberty and to be derived from the natural and individual right of self-defense.
One wonders how the Stevens dissent in Heller could have argued, from these lecture notes, that -St. George Tucker, on whom the Court relies heavily, did not consistently adhere to the position that the Amendment was designed to protect the ‗Blackstonian' self-defense right . . .‖ or that the notes suggest the Second -Amendment should be understood in the context of the compromise over military power represented by the original Constitution and the Second and Tenth Amendments.‖
23
The brief answer appears to be that the dissent relied uncritically on the portions of the lecture notes quoted by Saul Cornell in a 2006 article, 24 which the dissent cites as authority. 25 The article sets out the quotations cited by the dissent and argues that they reflect Tucker's -earliest formulation of the meaning of the Second Amendment,‖ and -casts the right to bear arms as a right of the states.‖
26
In fact, the article's quotations are misleading; they come from Tucker's discussion of the militia clauses of the original Constitution, which predictably deal with military power and the States. Tucker argues that the States have the power to arm their militias should Congress not do so since such power is not forbidden to States by the Constitution and hence is protected by the Tenth Amendment, just as any arms given would be protected by the Second Amendment.
27 When, less than twenty pages later, Tucker does discuss the Bill of Rights, the language he uses closely parallels his 1803 Blackstone's Commentaries, usually down to the word. 27 Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 12, at 127-29. 28 E.g., Tucker's Blackstone begins its discussion of the Second Amendment with -The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.‖ Tucker then proceeds to a condemnation of the British game laws. 1 TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, app. note D, at 300. 31 has had cause to seriously consider it (the suit failed on qualified immunity grounds, the Second Circuit finding that, unsurprisingly, its dimensions were not clearly established). Tucker is rather skeptical here, seeing the guarantee as evidencing a tolerance of standing armies.
No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law.

This clause by a kind of side wind seems to countenance the keeping up a standing army in time of peace; on which subject we have already offered some remarks. It is calculated in some measure to lessen the burden of the ___ to the individual, but by no means to add to the security of the nation.
IV. AMENDMENT IV Tucker's understanding of the Fourth Amendment is interesting from a historical standpoint. The Supreme Court has long considered the Amendment's warrant requirement as a subset of reasonableness-that is, a warrantless search is, unless justified, unreasonable and thus unconstitutional 29 Tucker's understanding of the British game laws was dated. The Game Acts forbade all but major landowners from hunting or owning tools that might be used for poaching. The 1671 Game Act added firearms to that list, but they were deleted by the 1692 Game Act. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 69-75, 125-26 (1994) . 30 It is noteworthy that Tucker sees the Second Amendment as far more extensive than the British guarantee, whose qualifications in his eyes rendered it nugatory. Tucker's favorite thesis is that, while American rights may have British common law origins, Americans' rights-consciousness has advanced far beyond them. 
V. AMENDMENTS V, VI, VII
A. Criminal Rights
Tucker's discussion of the criminal aspects of these amendments is cursory. He makes clear, however, that he feels the right to jury trial could bear expansion, to ensure that jurors are chosen from the vicinage rather than the State. In the early Republic, this would have meant that a defendant was essentially judged by jurors who knew him and the party bringing charges, and the reputation of both. 
B. Taking of Property
Tucker interestingly ties the Fifth Amendment's takings clause to Revolutionary War impressments of supplies and equipment. Supplying armed forces had long been a problem approached through the impressment power (Virginia statutes authorizing impressments date as far back as 1677 35 ). A 1781 statute authorized the governor to impress clothing, equipment, slaves, and horses for military use, adding that all property taken shall be appraised by two neutral persons with a certificate given to the owners, and -[a]ny person making impressment contrary hereto shall forfeit and pay double the value of the thing impressed.‖ 36 Tucker's understanding of the purpose of the takings clause sheds at least some light on the issue raised in Kelo v. City of New London, 37 relating to whether property may be taken for private but publicly beneficial use. The Virginia impressment statutes related solely to public use, and the earliest of them barred takings for public use or otherwise. VI. AMENDMENT VI Tucker, as with other rights related to criminal procedure, is cursory here. One might suppose that his heart lay with the civil rather than the criminal side of law practice. [P. 147] 35 An Act Restrayning the Impresse of Tymber, &c. (1677) VII. AMENDMENTS IX AND X Tucker's discussion of the Ninth Amendment stresses its importance. He displays admiration for Publius, the then-anonymous authors of The Federalist, but not for their position denying the necessity of a bill of rights. Tucker's justification of a bill of rights includes its explaining to every citizen the nature of their rights, a consideration that underscores original public meaning as an interpretative approach. Tucker's treatment of the Tenth Amendment foreshadows later conflicts over Federal pre-emption, and the dormant Commerce Clause. 
CONCLUSION
Tucker's lecture notes give remarkable insight into how an American jurist and academic understood the Bill of Rights immediately after its ratification. Tucker agrees with Jefferson that the Establishment Clause erects a powerful barrier between church and state, a view the Supreme Court would not take until the Twentieth Century. He sees freedom of expression as broadly, indeed absolutely, protected against federal interference, and as linked to freedom of thought. Even in wartime, he sees suppression of dissent or subversion as the path to tyranny, a view the Court would not take until 1969 (and has not fully taken to this day). S. 444, 447 (1969) (reversing conviction for advocating illegal behavior, but acknowledging that prosecution would be possible -where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action‖).
Tucker views the Second Amendment as an individual right derived from the natural right of self defense, a position that the Court only accepted in 2008. 40 And he describes the general Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as incorporating its warrant and probable cause requirements, a step not taken until 1948. 41 Tucker's lecture notes, in brief, indicate that this Framing period scholar was astonishingly modern.
Tucker's notes guide us toward an originalism that takes a very robust view of the Bill of Rights. If he condemned measures against pro-British speech taken in the darkest days of the Revolution, it is hard to see how he would countenance modern -hate crime‖ legislation, campaign limitations, or other restrictions upon expressive rights. His derivation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause from wartime impressment statutes is at least suggestive that he did not see it as permitting takings of property for private benefit. Tucker's notes may thus bring originalism in a full circle. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 , 2797 (2008 . 41 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948 
